DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
CANADA

OPERATIONAL RESEARCH DIVISION

**DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH (JOINT & LAND0**

**DOR(J&L) RESEARCH NOTE 9822**

# THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SCENARIO SET FOR DEPARTMENTAL FORCE PLANNING

**by**

**A. Bradfield**
**G. L. Christopher**
**LCol D. MacLean**

**NOVEMBER 1998**

OTTAWA, CANADA

National Defence Défense nationale

## OPERATIONAL RESEARCH DIVISION

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OTTAWA, ONTARIO NOVEMBER 1998

## ABSTRACT

The Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS) was tasked to coordinate the development of a minimum scenario set for departmental force planning. To meet this requirement the Director of Defence Analysis (DDA) sponsored a departmental workshop to develop the scenario set and to produce a brief write-up (a "snapshot") of each scenario selected. The foundation document for the exercise was the 1994 Defence White Paper, whilst the Defence Planning Guidance 1997 was used as an amplifying document. The scenarios selected were to be a minimum set, be credible and realistic, build upon work previously carried out and apply to the Canadian Forces as a whole, not be single service specific.

This report documents the proceedings of the workshop and the results that were produced.

## RÉSUMÉ

Le vice-chef d'état-major de la défense (VCEMD) a éte chargé de coordonner l'élaboration d'un ensemble de scénarios minimum aux fins de planification des forces du ministère. En réponse à ce besoin, le directeur - analyse de défense (DAD) a parrainé récemment un atelier dans le but d'élaborer un ensemble de scénarios et de produire un bref aperçu de chaque scénario choisi. Ce projet s'est fondé sur le document le Livre blanc sur la défense 1994, tandis que le document Guide de Planification de la Défense 1997 fournissait un complément d'information. Les scénarios choisis devaient constituer un ensemble minimum, ils devaient être crédibles et réalistes, ils devaient reprendre le travail déjà effectué, et ils devaient s'appliquer à l'ensemble des Forces canadiennes plutôt qu'à une armée en particulier.

Ce rapport présente une documentation des travaux de l'atelier et les résultats obtenu.

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# THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SCENARIO SET FOR DEPARTMENTAL FORCE PLANNING

## I. INTRODUCTION

### BACKGROUND

1. Major changes in the strategic environment have resulted in a considerable shift in responsibilities for the Canadian Forces. While the 1994 Defence White Paper (Ref. 1) addressed the policy aspects of these changes, internal reviews suggest that work still remains to be done in the area of force planning. It is critical that Departmental processes be capable of identifying and integrating issues that have the potential to demand fundamental alterations to the defence policy, strategy and program, for, as Sir Michael Howard noted (Ref. 2):

> [The military] is like a sailor navigating by dead reckoning. You have left the terra firma of the last war and are extrapolating from the experiences of that war. The greater the distance from the last war, the greater become the chances of error in this extrapolation. Occasionally there is a break in the clouds: a small-scale conflict occurs somewhere and gives you a "fix" by showing whether certain weapons and techniques are effective or not: but it is always a doubtful mix ..... For the most part you have to sail on in a fog of peace until at the last moment. Then, probably when it is too late, the clouds lift and there is land immediately ahead; breakers, probably, and rocks. Then you find out rather late in the day whether your calculations have been right or not.

2. In the past, force planning issues tended to be dealt with on a case by case basis. Analysis carried out in support of each issue was frequently based on a scenario. However, the scenarios were, in general, created for each individual study and then put aside. As a general rule, issues were addressed using a single scenario. Whilst this achieved the purpose

for individual issues it did not provide a framework for comprehensive force planning. For a multi-purpose force, as the Canadian Forces (CF) are, this approach provided only a partial response, which lacked a strategic joint service perspective.

3. In an effort to address the weaknesses of past practices a new approach to force planning has been promulgated. As part of this approach, the framework within which force planning takes place is also being updated. To truly reflect a comprehensive approach to force planning, capability analysis within a Departmental scenario framework is being adopted. As a step in this direction a decision was taken to adopt a scenario set that would be representative of the types of generic missions that the CF could be called upon to perform. These would then provide a framework for Departmental force planning, providing a tool by which future Departmental capabilities could be examined.

4. Since the goal was to develop scenarios for force planning purposes, it was decided that they should be limited to Canadian Forces operational tasks, i.e. strategic objective 1 in the 1997 Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) (Ref. 3). To be useful, the scenario set developed must span the spectrum of conflict within which the CF are expected to operate. The scenario set developed must also seek a balance between credibility and analytical utility. Since scenarios are to become a central tool in the force planning process it is important that they are centrally approved. Finally, to ensure the set reflect evolving defence policy and strategic circumstances, they will have to be reviewed on a regular basis.

5. The Director General Strategic Planning (DGSP) was tasked to coordinate the exercise (Ref. 4). After developing and trailing an approach, a Departmental workshop was held to create a minimum scenario set. Individuals drawn from across the Department participated in the workshop. The results of their deliberations are documented in this report.

## METHODOLOGY

6. The approach adopted was straightforward. The first step was to develop a list of the tasks that the Canadian Forces could be called upon to perform. The 1994 Defence White Paper was selected as the primary source document, the Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) 1997 was used as an amplifying document. It should be remembered, however, that the scenarios developed are to be used for future force planning purposes, hence some latitude had to be allowed for, particularly with respect to the DPG which has a five year timeframe. Having developed a comprehensive list of tasks the next step centered around the possible grouping of tasks. Tasks would be grouped together where they were considered to require similar capabilities or were strongly linked.

7. The next step was to develop a list of the scenario parameters that must be addressed in the scenarios. These include, for example, deployment over long as well as short distances, the ability to operate in countries with little or no support infrastructure in addition to a North American environment, and the ability to operate in different climatic environments.

8. Having ascertained the scenario parameters, the next step was to start matching them with the grouped tasks and develop strawman scenarios. Having developed this initial scenario list, a review for completeness, duplication or gaps was required. This process would then continue, adding more detail and reviewing for completeness until all were satisfied. At the end of the workshop the result sought was a snapshot description of each scenario, about a two-page description. This is, however, only the first step in the full use of this tool. Once the basic scenario set has been approved, considerably more effort will have to be expended expanding the snapshot to the level of detail required by the various user communities. In addition, the generation of a complete capability list for the Department and the comparison of this list to those capabilities currently in place will be required.

**PARTICIPANTS**

9. DGSP was tasked to coordinate the scenario development exercise. However, since the scenarios were to be representative of Departmental commitments it was important to get participants at the workshop with a wide variety of experience. Table I contains a listing of the workshop participants and the organizations with which they were affiliated.

**TABLE I**

**WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS**

| PARTICIPANT | ORGANIZATION |
|---|---|
| A Bradfield (Facilitator) | DDA 2 |
| LCol D MacLean (Facilitator) | DDA 3 |
| G Christopher | DDA 2-3 |
| Cdr D Hales/LCdr D McLean | DMFD 4/DMFD 4-4 |
| LCol W Peters | DLC 2-3 |
| Maj G. Conrad | DAPC 2-3 |
| Maj T Procyshyn | DGINT/J2 SRA 7-4 |
| Lt(N) P Hupé | J3 P&O 2-6 |
| Maj D Milne | J3 DRS |
| Maj D Fullerton/Maj C Lamarre | J4 LOG PLANS/LOG DOC |
| Maj R Fountain | DFPPC |
| Dr I Moen/ R Roy | CRAD |
| LCdr R Massell | DGOR/CORT |
| M Ormrod | DGOR/LFORT |

10. Due to other priorities ADM Policy & Communications could not support the workshop. It was agreed that they would provide their comments at a later date.

## II. WORKSHOP RESULTS

### DEVELOPMENT PROCEDURE

11. The scenario development workshop was held from 24 February to 6 March 1997 in the mornings only. The aim of the workshop was twofold. The first objective was to develop a minimum set of scenarios that cover the spectrum of missions that the CF could be called upon to perform. The second objective was to describe each selected scenario at the snapshot level. A package was sent to each participant a week before the workshop. This included an introduction to the exercise, what the objective was and why it was chosen, a list of starting assumptions and suggested reading. To get the exercise started, it also included some of the results of a similar exercise held within Directorate of Defence Analysis (DDA). The idea was to indicate the types of results required and to stimulate thought.

12. The assembled group participated actively and constructively, all demonstrating the right amount of self control at the right moment. The difficult questions were asked and, to the extent possible, dealt with. This was not an easy exercise, but the objectives were met.

13. As with any exercise there had to be a starting point. A list of starting assumptions was prepared and circulated in a pre-workshop package. These assumptions provided focus and perspective for the workshop. The assumptions also acted as a set of guiding principles to direct the efforts of the group in the development of the scenarios and in the future application of the scenarios. The list of starting assumptions is included Table II.

14. To focus the discussion and provide a logical sequence towards the specification of force planning scenarios, the operational tasks that the CF could be called upon to perform were identified. To facilitate the process, it was decided to divide the task into three areas, namely: defence of Canada; defence of Canada/US territory; and contributions to international security, following the grouping used in the '94 White Paper. This action promoted consistency with the general approach used in previous defence planning activities and allowed the linkages between operational tasks for the CF and Canadian defence policy to be established.

15. Table III summarizes the results of this phase of the workshop.

## TABLE II

## STARTING ASSUMPTIONS FOR SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT

| Serial | Principle |
|---|---|
| 1 | Scenarios must be based on tasks derived from the `94 White Paper, with DPG 97 as an amplifying document, projected into the future 6 to 20 years. |
| 2 | Multi-purpose combat capable forces operating jointly (and combined in international settings) must be accepted as a fundamental requirement. |
| 3 | The scenarios must comply with existing international agreements. |
| 4 | The scenarios must be illustrative and cover the full spectrum of possible CF operations. |
| 5 | The scenarios must permit the identification of the full set of capabilities required by the CF. |
| 6 | The scenarios must apply to the CF as a whole and not be specific to any one service. (Service-specific scenarios may be derived from the force planning scenario set.) |
| 7 | The scenarios must be realistic given the national and world situation, current and foreseeable. |
| 8 | The minimum number of required scenarios will form the force planning set. |
| 9 | The development effort will build upon previous work as much as possible. |
| 10 | Scenario development will initially be limited to the "snapshot" level, with further development work to be pursued later. |
| 11 | The scenarios will be cyclically reviewed. |
| 12 | Scenario-based planning has the full endorsement of Senior Management as an approach to strategic/operational level force development. |
| 13 | Director General Strategic Planning will retain "stewardship" of the developed scenarios. |
| 14 | The scenarios will be centrally approved. |
| 15 | At the snapshot level, the scenarios will be unclassified and available in the public domain. |

## TABLE III: OPERATIONAL TASKS FOR THE CF

| Mission/Sub-mission | Serial | Task |
|---|---|---|
| **DEFENCE OF CANADA** | 1. | Defence of Canada |
| | 2. | Surveillance of Canadian territory, airspace and approaches |
| | 3. | Control of Canadian territory, airspace and approaches |
| | 4. | Aid of the civil power |
| | 5. | Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief |
| | 6. | Support to Law Enforcement Agencies |
| | 7. | Counter-terrorism |
| | 8. | Search and Rescue |
| | 9. | Promotion of Canadian interests abroad |
| **- Support to Other Government Dept.** | 10. | Drug interdiction |
| | 11. | Interception of illegal immigrants |
| | 12. | Environmental surveillance |
| | 13. | National Resources enforcement/protection |
| **DEFENCE OF NORTH AMERICA (CANADA / US)** | 14. | Defensive operations in conjunction with US forces |
| | 15. | Combined surveillance of Canada/US territory, aerospace and approaches (NORAD) |
| | 16. | Combined control of Canada/US territory, airspace and approaches (NORAD) |
| | 17. | Support to Law Enforcement Agencies (e.g. drug interdiction) |
| | 18. | Combined counter-terrorist operations |
| | 19. | Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief |
| **CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY** | 20. | Collective defence (NATO) |
| | 21. | Collective Operations (other) |
| | 22. | Peace Enforcement operations |
| | 23. | Peacemaking/ Preventative Diplomacy (NATO/UN) |
| | 24. | Stability enhancement operations |
| | 25. | Preventive deployment of forces |
| | 26. | Peacekeeping |
| | 27. | Peacebuilding (post conflict restoration) |
| | 28. | Humanitarian assistance |
| | 29. | Disaster relief |
| | 30. | Verification of Arms control agreements |
| | 31. | Protection/evacuation of Canadians overseas |

16. Having established the list of operational tasks, the next step centered around generating possible scenario classes and associating tasks with the scenario classes. This activity identified where duplication of operational tasks could occur among potential scenario classes and strove to avoid or, at least, minimize this effect. This effort supported the goal of creating the minimum number of scenarios required to capture all the capability requirements of the CF.

17. It was recognized that more than one scenario from each scenario class may be required to capture all the capability requirements and to test the full range of values that scenario parameters could assume. It was also accepted that as specific scenarios are created, it might be discovered that capabilities and parameters that would be associated with a scenario class may already be captured and separate or additional scenarios for that class may not be required.

18. Table IV summarizes the results of the effort to define scenario classes.

**TABLE IV**

**SCENARIO CLASSES AND ASSOCIATED TASKS**

| Serial | Scenario Class | Associated Operational Tasks |
|---|---|---|
| | **Defence of Canada** | |
| 1. | Surveillance/Control/Defence of Canada | 1,2,3 |
| 2. | Domestic Operations | 4,6,7,8,10,11,12,13,17,18 |
| | **Contributions to International Security** | |
| 3. | Surveillance/Control/Collective Defence | 14,15,16,20,21 |
| 4. | Peace Support Operations | 22,23,24,25,26,27,30 |
| 5. | Protection/Evacuation of Canadians Overseas | 31 |
| | **Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief** | |
| 6. | National | 5 |
| 7. | International | 19,28,29 |

Note: Operational Task 9, Promotion of Canadian interests abroad, has not been included per se in the above list. On closer examination, it was felt that many of the other operational tasks directly supported this task. As such, it was not necessary to include Task 9 specifically with any scenario class nor did it warrant a scenario of its own.

19. As well as looking at operational tasks that the CF could be called upon to perform, it was important to develop a basic appreciation of the parameters that should be considered by the planning scenarios in the set. After developing a partial list, attention was drawn to the Universal Joint Task List (Ref. 5), the results of a major US initiative to identify required military tasks at the strategic, operational and tactical level. A version modified for Canadian purposes has been created.

20. Associated with the Universal Joint Task Lists, both American and Canadian versions, is a set of conditions relevant to military operations. These conditions cover parameters of the physical, military and civil environments. The conditions associated with the Canadian Joint Task List are listed in Annex B. This list is quite detailed, more than is required for scenario descriptions at the snapshot level. The workshop did not attempt to create a specific linkage between the conditions and individual scenarios, the list was used as a general guide and reference to ensure that the set of scenarios as a whole would be able to include and assess all relevant conditions.

## SCENARIO OUTLINES

21. The task of developing individual scenario outlines then began. This task was approached by grouping operational tasks into logical associations that would occur naturally in the context of a proposed scenario. The task groupings would then identify where an individual scenario was required. The participants explained the general context for the scenario as they justified their proposal for grouping the operational tasks.

22. The results of the task groupings are illustrated in Table V. In the table, the order of the tasks has been shuffled to facilitate displaying the task groupings. The tasks are plotted against the three defence missions. Shaded ellipses overlay the tasks to identify the proposed groupings. Each grouping was developed as an individual scenario.

23. Table VI elaborates on Table V, adding some detail to the outline of a possible scenario for each task grouping.

24. It will be noted from Tables V and VI that the operational task Defence of Canada (1) is grouped with the tasks of National Resources Enforcement (13) and Support to Law Enforcement Agencies (6). At first glance this may not appear to be coherent. However, the group consensus was that any significant threat to Canada would almost certainly call into play the United States and would be addressed as another scenario. So, a unilateral defence of Canada would be constrained to the lower level in the spectrum of conflict and would likely result from a resources/sovereignty dispute.

## TABLE V: OPERATIONAL TASK GROUPINGS



| Operational Tasks | Missions | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Defence of Canada | Defence of N.A. (Canada/US) | Contributions to International Security |
| 8. Search and Rescue | ● | | |
| 5. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief | ● | | |
| 19. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief | | ● | |
| 28. Humanitarian assistance | | ● | ● |
| 29. Disaster relief | | | ● |
| 2. Surveillance of Canadian territory, airspace and approaches | ● | | |
| 3. Control of Canadian territory, airspace and approaches | ● | | |
| 10. Drug interdiction | ● | | |
| 17. Support to Law Enforcement Agencies | ● | ● | |
| 11. Interception of illegal immigrants | ● | | |
| 12. Environmental surveillance | ● | | |
| 6. Support to Law Enforcement Agencies | ● | | |
| 1. Defence of Canada | ● | | |
| 13. National Resources enforcement/protection | ● | | |
| 31. Protection/evacuation of Canadians overseas | | | ● |
| 4. Aid of the civil power | ● | | |
| 7. Counter-terrorism | ● | | |
| 18. Combined Counter-terrorist operations | | ● | |
| 24. Stability enhancement operations | | | ● |
| 26. Peacekeeping | | | ● |
| 27. Peacebuilding (post conflict restoration) | | | ● |
| 30. Verification of Arms Control agreements | | | ● |
| 25. Preventive deployment of forces | | | ● |
| 21. Collective Operations (other) | | | ● |
| 22. Peace Enforcement operations | | | ● |
| 23. Peacemaking/Preventative Diplomacy (NATO/UN) | | | ● |
| 14. Defensive operations in conjunction with US forces | | ● | |
| 15. Combined surveillance of Canada/US territory, airspace and approaches | | ● | |
| 16. Combined control of Canada/US territory, airspace and approaches | | ● | |
| 20. Collective defence (NATO) | | | ● |

## TABLE VI

## SCENARIO OUTLINES

| PROPOSED SCENARIO | OP TASK | SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT | PROB ABILITY | REALISTIC EXAMPLE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **CANADA** | | | | |
| 1. Surveillance/ Control/Respond | 2, 3, 6, 10, 11, 12, 17 | Low | med - high | Day to day surveillance job - Canada and approaches, drug interdiction / illegal immigrants |
| 2. National Sovereignty / Interests Enforcement | 1, 6, 13 | Low - med | low - med | Foreign military backing up foreign intervention into Canadian area / interests, protect national resources |
| 3. Aid of the Civil Power | 4 | Low | med | Dissident group |
| 4. Counter-terrorist operations | 7, 18 | Low | low - med | Any typical major terrorist operation |
| 5. Search and Rescue | 8 | Low | high | Air or sea disaster (remote land or maritime) |
| 6. Disaster Relief | 5 | Low | med - high | Disaster within Canada |
| **NORTH AMERICA** | | | | |
| 7. Defence of North America | 14, 15, 16 | High | low | Being involved in collective defence and suffering retribution |
| **INTERNATIONAL** | | | | |
| 8. Collective Defence | 20 | Med - high | Low | NATO (in Theatre ops) |
| 9. Peace Support (under Chapter 6) | 24, 25, 26, 27, 30 | Low - med | high | Bosnia |
| 10. Peace Support (under Chapter 7) | 21, 22, 23, 25 | med - high | med | Gulf War |
| 11. Humanitarian Assistance - international | 19, 28, 29 | Low | low-med | International Humanitarian - Central Africa |
| 12. Evacuation of Canadians overseas | 31 | Low-med | low | Evacuation of Canadian Nationals (Haiti) |
| Dropped | 9 | | | |

25. The workshop participants also discussed, at length, the counter-terrorism tasks and the necessary details for a scenario to assess the capability requirements. In consideration of

the guiding principles for this exercise, it was felt that a separate scenario should not be developed for this task. Two factors strongly supported this decision. First, the details of the scenario, the role and the responsibilities of the CF required to support the follow-on assessment would make it very difficult to keep the snapshot unclassified. Second, force planning for the units responsible for anti-terrorism is dealt with, for the most part, independently of other force planning activities. For these reasons, it was resolved that a separate anti-terrorism scenario would not be included in the scenario set and that an anti-terrorism component would be included in another scenario, where appropriate.

26. One of the requirements of the exercise was that the scenarios developed had to cover the full spectrum of possible CF operations. Figure 1 illustrates where the proposed scenarios lie on the spectrum of conflict relevant to the Canadian Forces. No scenario covers just a single point on the spectrum, nor should they given that the scenarios are intended to be representative, not specific. What is illustrated in Figure 1 is the part of the spectrum of conflict to which each scenario should be limited.

## SCENARIO SNAPSHOTS

27. Following the discussion at the workshop, the DDA prepared scenario snapshot descriptors. The full snapshot for each scenario can be found in Annex C. Included in the snapshot is a brief summary of the situation, followed by a description of the physical, military and civil environments. In each case a mission success criteria was identified. A brief summary of each scenario follows. For ease of reading they appear in the same order that they appear in Figure 1.

28. **Search and Rescue in Canada.** The Department has clear search and rescue (SAR) responsibilities. To fully capture the capabilities required to carry out this mission, two sub-scenarios are proposed. The first involves a rescue from a ship at sea. The second involves a search and rescue of an overdue small aircraft in the north. SAR is one of the few CF missions where the full operational role is carried out on a day to day basis, thus expansion of these incidents should not require much effort. Either of these scenarios would operate concurrently with normal search and rescue activity consistent with the season and area of activity.




**Figure 1: Spectrum of Conflict**

29. **Disaster Relief in Canada.** The CF play a key role in responding to natural and man-made disasters. The proposed scenario is one developed by Emergency Preparedness Canada and concerns an earthquake that has occurred on the west coast of North America. Major devastation has occurred north and south of the border, resulting in significant damage. The CF are called in to assist in the relief of human suffering and to help authorities re-establish the local infrastructure. Because this scenario has been "borrowed" from Emergency Preparedness Canada considerable detail exists and is available for users of this scenario.

30. **International Humanitarian Assistance.** The Armed Forces are being called upon to provide humanitarian assistance/ disaster relief in an international setting. The proposed scenario involves a Central African country, where, as part of an international force, elements of the CF are to provide humanitarian aid to relieve human suffering and help improve the situation until non-governmental organizations (NGO's) once more can function and assume control. Since the situation described is similar to at least one previously proposed mission some of the detail required at lower levels has already been addressed.

31. **Evacuation of Canadians Overseas.** The CF must maintain the capability to assist the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) in the protection and evacuation of Canadians from areas threatened by imminent conflict. The scenario proposed involves a permissive evacuation of Canadians and other nationals by a combined force. The scenario is already in existence, developed by the former Directorate of Land Operational Research (DLOR).

32. **Surveillance/Control of Canadian Territory and Approaches.** The provision of surveillance and control is an integral part of CF activities in Canada. The proposed scenario situates this day to day responsibility, using incidents of drug smuggling/ landings of illegal immigrants as catalysts. In this scenario the CF work in co-operation with other government departments (OGD's) to conduct surveillance and control operations. Incidents such as those described by the scenario have already occurred, thus much of the background work has already been completed.

33. **Peace Support Operations (Chapter 6).** Canada is strongly in favour of a vigorous and effective United Nations, and believes that situations requiring international military action should be dealt with in accordance with the terms of the Charter. The proposed peacekeeping scenario involves the CF leading a UN peacekeeping force brokering a cease-fire along the border between the two countries, as well as enforcing a naval embargo and a no-flight zone. Since this type of situation has occurred during the last few years the expansion of the snapshot should not prove onerous.

34. **Aid of the Civil Power.** Throughout Canadian history, provinces have been able to call upon the armed forces to maintain or restore law and order where it is beyond the power of civil authorities to do so. The proposed scenario centres around CF assistance in the establishment of law and order in a time of severe drought in Canada where disputes over water have escalated beyond the point where local authorities can cope.

35. **National Sovereignty/ Interests Enforcement.** Canadians have made clear their wish to protect Canada's natural resources from illegal and highly damaging exploitation. The proposed scenario uses this theme, centering the operation around the protection of mineral deposits off Canada's coasts. The mission is to assist OGD's in the enforcement of Canadian claims in the extended Economic Exclusive Zone. Whilst the actual scenario is hypothetical, ideas for its development were borrowed from several real-life occurrences.

36. **Peace Support Operations (Chapter 7).** As previously stated, Canada is strongly in supportive of a strong UN. The scenario proposes that elements of the CF, as part of a coalition, are to conduct operations to restore pre-conflict boundaries during a dispute between two countries. This type of operation has already occurred, and is representative of peace support operations mandated under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.

37. **Defence of Canadian/ US Territory.** Canada is committed to play its part in the defence of the combined territories, the planning of which has evolved into the Canada US Basic Security Plan. The scenario proposed, to run concurrently with the collective defence scenario, involves the timely provision of threat warning and attack assessment in times of heightened tension.

38. **Collective Defence.** In the 94 Defence White Paper Canada re-affirmed its commitment to contribute to international security. Indeed, Canada's defence policy is built on the foundation of collective defence. The scenario proposed, which involves the invasion of a NATO member state, illustrates one particular example of this commitment. Whilst the scenario proposed is hypothetical, it draws upon clear commitments.

# III. CONCLUSIONS

## WORKSHOP SUCCESS

39. Through the efforts of a dedicated group of people, bringing a wealth of experience to the table, a set of force planning scenarios have been defined to the snapshot level-of-detail. While this is only the first step in the development of a comprehensive force planning framework, it is a vital starting point. The scenarios will provide the definition required to support a consistent and thorough approach to planning the CF for the future.

40. The guiding principles prepared for the exercise, in fact, set out the objectives for the workshop. The principles were constantly utilized and applied in examining proposals put forth. It is the firm belief of the participants that the scenario set satisfies these objectives. The scenario set reflects a joint force employed in operations spanning the expected spectrum of conflict, consistent with Canadian defence policy.

## UNRESOLVED ISSUES

41. In carrying out this exercise several topics were raised that were beyond the scope of the group to resolve. These issues are noted for follow-on action.

42. **Information Warfare.** The list of tasks and the scenarios developed could, in some senses, be considered to represent traditional military missions. In the workshop there was some discussion about this and about the fact that technology may be presenting us with newer kinds of warfare, for example, information warfare. The workshop participants debated about whether this type of warfare was rightly included within each scenario, whether it justified a scenario of its own, or a combination of these two outcomes. It was finally decided that information warfare should be included as a component of each relevant scenario. In addition the issue should be flagged for further consideration. As technological and geo-political changes occur, it may well be necessary to adopt scenarios that reflect a new reality.

43. **Defence of North America.** In developing the list of tasks and possible scenario groupings, there was considerable discussion about security arrangements in the North American/ American continents. Currently, although many talk about "defence of North America" in reality what they are talking about is Canada/US defence. With the expansion of agreements within the "American" context, would this have an effect on defence? Again, the decision was made to stay with the current situation regarding the scenarios developed,

however this issue may also warrant further consideration.

44. **Mission Success Factors.** Within each scenario, the group identified some mission success criteria. In several cases the issue of casualties arose. Meeting the military objective was one thing, but if it was achieved with many casualties, perhaps some missions would then be regarded as less successful. We are aware that other countries include a casualty factor in their mission success criteria. There are however some problems: casualty rates are traditionally difficult to predict; and what is acceptable anyway? This topic needs further study.

**WAY AHEAD**

45. **Departmental Approval.** The scenario snapshots described in this paper are the results of the concerted efforts of a small group with, collectively, a wide breadth of experience. To ensure that the scenario set has truly achieved the objectives, it will need to undergo wider scrutiny, both within and outside the Department. Once this has occurred, and the appropriate modifications have been made, the scenario set must be staffed for Departmental approval. The scenario set must have formal recognition if it is to be the envisioned foundation for force planning.

46. **Scenario Expansion.** Once approved, it is anticipated that the scenarios will have to be developed to a further level of detail in order to support detailed analysis of CF capability requirements and force planning options. It is estimated that an operational level-of-detail will be required to support these analyses. The effort to expand the scenario snapshots will be led by DDA in co-operation with an external working group, such as that which developed the snapshots.

47. There will also be a need to develop even more detailed "vignettes" to address tactical issues. The operational-level scenario descriptions should provide adequate focus to ensure consistency between the scenario descriptions at the operational and tactical levels. It is suggested that this further expansion in detail be done on an as required basis by the user organizations. As "stewards" of the scenario set, DDA should be given copies of the expanded versions. If shortcomings are encountered with any of the scenarios or the scenario set, DDA should also be notified.

48. **Periodic Review.** To ensure the relevancy of the scenarios for force planning, they must be reviewed periodically to remain consistent with Canadian defence policy, strategic direction and the evolving world situation. Clearly, changes to defence policy and/or strategic direction will make a review mandatory. However, the changing world situation (technological, demographic, geo-political, environmental, etc.) will also necessitate changes to the scenarios to ensure that they truly reflect the future interests and requirements of the CF. To accomplish this, a cyclical review process for the scenarios must be instituted. The period between reviews can be determined based on the rate of change observed in strategic global trends.

49. **Analysis Tools.** The force planning scenarios provide the foundation upon which to rationalize the Canadian Forces of the future. While the scenarios provide a background against which to judge force planning options, in and of themselves, they do not dictate the appropriate force structure or capability inventory required by the CF. Analysis of the scenarios will allow the capability requirements of the CF to be identified and rationalized within the allocated defence budget. How best to satisfy the requirements will remain a challenge beyond the scope of the scenario framework.

50. To proceed from a set of force planning scenarios to the determination of capability requirements will demand an integrated analysis process. The Operational Research team within DDA will lead the development of the scenario analysis methodology. This task should be pursued with the support of an external working group and OR representatives from the Director General Operational Research environmental and central teams.

51. Given the time and resource considerations for this developmental activity, an evolutionary approach should be taken towards the construction of the scenario analysis toolset. The goal for the development of the analysis tools should be to provide a basic analysis capability as quickly as possible and enhance the capability over time. A rudimentary scenario analysis package should be provided as soon as possible to support the timely transition to the scenario framework for force planning. Once established, the rudimentary analysis capability can be expanded and enhance to incorporate additional factors and analysis methods. In this way, the analysis toolset can advance towards one able to optimize the capabilities of the Canadian Forces, while providing analytical support to deal with current force planning issues.

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4. 1902-5-2 (DDA 2), Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) letter dated 11 February 1997

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ANNEX A
DOR(J&L RN 9822
NOVEMBER 1998

# SCENARIO PARAMETERS

## 1.0 PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

*Location*

1.1 Land

C1.1.1 Terrain
C1.1.1.1 Terrain Relief
C1.1.1.2 Terrain Elevation
C1.1.1.3 Terrain Slope
C1.1.1.4 Terrain Firmness
C1.1.1.5 Terrain Traction
C1.1.1.6 Vegetation
C1.1.1.7 Terrain Relief Features
C1.1.2 Geological Features
C1.1.2.1 Geological Activity
C1.1.2.2 Magnetic Variation
C1.1.2.3 Subsurface Water
C1.1.3 Synthetic Terrain Features
C1.1.3.1 Urbanization
C1.1.3.2 Significant Civil Structures
C1.1.3.3 Synthetic Terrain Contrast
C1.1.3.4 Obstacles to Movement
C1.1.3.5 Route Availability
C1.1.4 Landlocked Waters
C1.1.4.1 Landlocked Waters Depth
C1.1.4.2 Landlocked Waters Currents
C1.1.4.3 Landlocked Waters Width
C1.1.4.4 Landlocked Waters Bottom
C1.1.4.5 Landlocked Waters Shore Gradient

1.2 Sea

C1.2.1 Ocean Waters
C1.2.1.1 Ocean Depth
C1.2.1.2 Ocean Currents
C1.2.1.3 Sea State
C1.2.1.4 Ocean Temperature
C1.2.1.5 Saline Content

C1.2.1.6 Ocean Features
C1.2.1.7 Sea Room
C1.2.1.8 Ocean Acoustics
C1.2.1.9 Ocean Bioluminescence
C1.2.1.10 Ocean Ice
C1.2.1.11 Ocean Ice Thickness
C1.2.1.12 Ocean Ambient Noise
C1.2.2 Ocean Bottom
C1.2.2.1 Sea Bottom Contours
C1.2.2.2 Sea Bottom Composition
C1.2.3 Harbor Capacity
C1.2.3.1 Harbor Shelter
C1.2.3.2 Harbor Depth
C1.2.3.3 Harbor Currents
C1.2.4 Littoral Characteristics
C1.2.4.1 Littoral Gradient
C1.2.4.2 Littoral Composition
C1.2.4.3 Littoral Terrain Features
C1.2.4.4 Littoral Tides
C1.2.4.5 Littoral Currents
C1.2.5 Riverine Environment
C1.2.5.1 Riverine Navigability
C1.2.5.2 Riverine Tidal Turbulence
C1.2.5.3 Riverine Current
C1.2.5.4 Riverine Bank Gradient
C1.2.6 Shipping Presence
C1.2.6.1 Shipping Density
C1.2.6.2 Shipping Type
C1.2.6.3 Shipping Indentifiability

1.3 Air

C1.3.1 Climate
C1.3.1.1 Season
C1.3.1.2 Weather Systems
C1.3.1.3 Weather
C1.3.1.3.1 Air Temperature
C1.3.1.3.2 Barometric Pressure
C1.3.1.3.3 Surface Wind Velocity
C1.3.1.3.3.1 Low Altitude Wind Velocity
C1.3.1.3.3.2 Medium Altitude Wind Velocity
C1.3.1.3.3.3 High Altitude Wind Velocity
C1.3.1.3.4 Wind Direction
C1.3.1.3.5 Humidity
C1.3.1.3.6 Precipitation
C1.3.1.3.7 Altitude

C1.3.2 Visibility
C1.3.2.1 Light
C1.3.2.2 Obscurants
C1.3.3 Atmospheric Weapon Effects
C1.3.3.1 Nuclear Effects
C1.3.3.1.1 Nuclear Blast/Thermal Effects
C1.3.3.1.2 Nuclear Radiation Effects
C1.3.3.2 Chemical Effects
C1.3.3.3 Biological Effects
C1.3.3.4 Electromagnetic Effects
C1.3.4 Airspace Availability

1.4 Space
C1.4.1 Objects in Space
C1.4.1.1 Orbit Density
C1.4.1.2 Orbit Type
C1.4.2 Solar and Geomagnetic Activity
C1.4.3 High Energy Particles

**2.0 MILITARY ENVIRONMENT**

*National Strategy*

*Strategic Military Objectives*

*Canadian Defence Policy*

*Canadian Doctrine*

*Canadian Tactics*

**2.1 Mission**

**C2.1.1 Mission Instructions *(Military Operational Mission)***

**C2.1.1.1 Command Level**

**C2.1.1.2 Pre-Existing Arrangements**

**C2.1.1.3 Mission Classification**

**C2.1.1.4 ROE**

**C2.1.1.5 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)**

**C2.1.1.6 Military Commitments to Other Nations**

**C2.1.1.7 Military Commitments from Other Nations**

**C2.1.2 Legal State**

**C2.1.3 Mission Preparation**

**C2.1.4 Theater Dimensions**

**C2.1.4.1 Location**

**C2.1.4.2 Theater(s)**

**C2.1.4.3 Joint Operations Area**

**C2.1.4.4 Tactical Area of Responsibility**

**C2.1.4.5 Intertheater Distance**

**C2.1.4.6 Intratheater Distance**

**C2.1.5 Time Available**

**C2.1.5.1 Lead Time**

**C2.1.5.2 Mission Duration**

**2.2 Forces**

***Number of Concurrent Operations***

***Readiness Levels/Warning Times***

**C2.2.1 Forces Assigned**

***Logistical Support Assigned***

**C2.2.2 Competing Apportionments**

**C2.2.3 Forces Allocated**

**C2.2.4 Personnel Capability**

**C2.2.4.1 Personnel Nutrition & Health**

**C2.2.4.2 Personnel Literacy**

**C2.2.4.3 Personnel Physical Conditioning**

**C2.2.4.4 Personnel Morale**

**C2.2.4.5 Personnel Experience**

**C2.2.4.6 Personnel Fatigue**

**C2.2.5 Modern Military Systems**

**C2.2.5.1 Modern Weapons Systems**

**C2.2.5.2 Modern Information & Intelligence Processing Systems**

C2.2.5.3 Military Systems Reliability
C2.2.5.4 Military Systems Maturity
C2.2.6 Interoperability *(Alliance Forces and Support)*
C2.2.7 Military Force Relationships
2.3 Command, Control, & Communications– Related Conditions
*NGO Integration / Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC)*
*Information Warfare Considerations*
C2.3.1 Command Arrangements
C2.3.1.1 Joint Staff Integration
C2.3.1.2 *Combined* / Multinational Integration
C2.3.1.3 Staff Expertise
C2.3.1.4 Pre-Existing Command
C2.3.1.5 Command Authority
C2.3.1.6 Communications Connectivity
C2.3.1.7 Classification
C2.3.1.8 Information Exchange
C2.3.1.9 Information Volume
C2.3.2 Military Style
C2.3.2.1 Leadership Style
C2.3.2.2 Force Emphasis
C2.3.2.3 Flexibility of Warfare Style
C2.3.2.4 Component Headquarters Location
2.4 Intelligence – Related Conditions
C2.4.1 Warning
C2.4.2 Intelligence Data Base
C2.4.3 Theater Intelligence Organization
C2.4.4 Theater Intelligence Access
C2.4.5 Intelligence Countermeasure Capability
C2.4.6 Certitude of Data
2.5 Deployment, Movement, & Maneuver– Related Conditions
C2.5.1 LOC and Planning Status
C2.5.1.1 Task Force Movement Table Availability
C2.5.1.2 Deployment Lead Time
C2.5.1.3 Intertheater LOCs
C2.5.1.4 Intratheater LOCs
C2.5.1.5 Entry Capability
C2.5.2 Lift Assets
C2.5.2.1 Airlift Assets
C2.5.2.2 Sealift Assets
C2.5.2.3 Ground Transportation Assets
C2.5.2.5 Refueling Assets
C2.5.3 En Route Support
C2.5.3.1 Intermediate Staging Bases
C2.5.3.2 Overflight/Passage Rights

C2.5.3.3 En Route Supply
C2.5.4 Reception and Onward Movement
C2.5.4.1 Reception Facilities
C2.5.4.1.1 Wharfage
C2.5.4.1.2 Maximum on Ground (MOG)
C2.5.4.1.3 Runway Length
C2.5.4.1.4 Runway Weight Bearing Capacity
C2.5.4.2 Onward Movement Facilities
C2.5.4.2.1 Beddown Facilities
C2.5.4.2.2 Marshalling Facilities
C2.5.4.2.3 Staging Area

2.6 Firepower – Related Conditions
C2.6.1 Degree of Dispersion
C2.6.2 Degree of Camouflage
C2.6.3 Target Hardness
C2.6.4 Preplanned Targets
C2.6.5 Target Mobility
C2.6.6 Target Range
C2.6.7 Collateral Damage Potential
C2.6.8 Target Thermal Contrast

2.7 Protection – Related Conditions
C2.7.1 Rear Area/Local Security
C2.7.2 Air Superiority
C2.7.3 Space Control
C2.7.3.1 Space Platforms
C2.7.3.2 Space Platforms (Availability)
C2.7.3.3 Space Platforms (Linkability)
C2.7.4 Maritime Superiority
C2.7.5 Ground Superiority

2.8 Sustainment – Related Conditions
*Duration of Task*
*Degree of Mobilization*
C2.8.1 Sustainment Facilities
C2.8.2 Deployed Supplies
C2.8.3 Resupply
C2.8.4 Pre-positioned Materiel
C2.8.5 Host-Nation Support (HNS)
C2.8.6 Commercial Procurement

2.9 Threat – Related Conditions
C2.9.1 Threat
C2.9.2 Threat Form
C2.9.3 Threat Existence
C2.9.4 Threat Posture
C2.9.5 Threat Size

C2.9.5.1 Threat Land Foce Size
C2.9.5.2 Threat Naval Force Size
C2.9.5.3 Threat Air Force Size
C2.9.6 Threat Disposition

**3.0 CIVIL ENVIRONMENT**

**3.1 Political Policies**

**C3.1.1 Domestic Political Support**

**C3.1.1.1 Domestic Public Support**

**C3.1.1.2 Governmental Support**

**C3.1.1.3 Interdepartmental/Interagency Relationships**

**C3.1.1.4 Legality**

**C3.1.1.5 Press Relations**

**C3.1.2 International Politics *(International/Host Nation Limitations)***

**C3.1.2.1 Major Power Involvement**

**C3.1.2.2 Foreign Government Stability**

**C3.1.2.3 Foreign Government Support**

**C3.1.2.4 Foreign Public Opinion**

**C3.1.2.5 International Organization Support**

**C3.1.2.6 Multinational Business Support**

**C3.1.3 GECCO Decisions**

**C3.1.3.1 Number of Crises**

**C3.1.3.2 Mission Priority**

**C3.1.3.3 Mobilization Level**

**C3.1.3.3.1 Force Level**

**C3.1.3.3.2 Draft**

**C3.1.3.3.3 Mobilization Facilities**

**C3.1.3.4 Restraints on Action**

**3.2 Culture**

***National / Local History***

**C3.2.1 Language**

**C3.2.1.1 Language Translation**

**C3.2.1.2 Language Translators**

**C3.2.2 Customs Adjustment**

**C3.2.2.1 Societal Openness**

**C3.2.2.2 Legal Penalties**

**C3.2.2.3 Law Source**

**C3.2.3 Religious Beliefs**

**C3.2.3.1 Religious Unity**

**C3.2.3.2 Religious Militancy**

**C3.2.3.3 Religion-State Relationship**

**C3.2.4 Significant Cultural Sites**

**C3.2.5 Cultural Unity**

**C3.2.6 National Character**

**C3.2.6.1 National Discipline**

**C3.2.6.2 National Aggressiveness**

**C3.2.6.3 Nationalism**

**C3.2.6.4 Ethnocentrism**

**C3.2.6.5 Internationalism**

3.3 Economy

- C3.3.1 Population
- C3.3.1.1 Size of Military
- C3.3.1.2 Population Growth Rate
- C3.3.1.3 Educated Population
- C3.3.1.4 Civil Health
- C3.3.1.5 Health Risk
- C3.3.1.6 Civil Unrest
- C3.3.2 Refugee Impact
- C3.3.2.1 Refugee (Type)
- C3.3.2.2 Refugee Congestion
- C3.3.2.3 Refugee Care Responsibility
- C3.3.2.4 Refugee Relocation Effort
- C3.3.3 Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
- C3.3.4 International Economic Position
- C3.3.4.1 Economic Self-Sufficiency
- C3.3.4.1.1 Self-Sufficiency in Food
- C3.3.4.1.2 Self-Sufficiency in Fuel
- C3.3.4.1.3 Self-Sufficiency in Raw Materials
- C3.3.4.1.4 Self-Sufficiency in Finished Goods
- C3.3.4.1.5 Self-Sufficiency in Machinery
- C3.3.4.2 Fiscal Position
- C3.3.4.3 Infrastructure Dependence
- C3.3.5 Industry
- C3.3.5.1 Industrialization
- C3.3.5.2 Industrial Growth Rate
- C3.3.5.3 Electrical Production
- C3.3.5.4 Armaments Production Capacity
- C3.3.6 National Potential
- C3.3.6.1 Transportation Infrastructure
- C3.3.6.2 Telecommunications Infrastructure
- C3.3.6.3 Available Capital
- C3.3.7 Science & Technology
- C3.3.7.1 Basic Research
- C3.3.7.2 Research Application (Military)
- C3.3.7.3 High Technology Production
- C3.3.7.4 Information Management

ANNEX B
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## SCENARIO SNAPSHOTS FROM WORKSHOP (FEB 1997)

### SCENARIO 1 - SEARCH AND RESCUE IN CANADA

1. **Background:**

   a. The 94 Defence White Paper states "The Department of National Defence and the CF make a vital contribution to the maintenance and operation of Canada's search and rescue capability. While elements of this capability are provided by other federal and provincial organizations, the CF:

      - are responsible for air search and rescue;
      - provide significant resources to assist the Coast Guard in marine search and rescue;
      - assist local authorities in land search and rescue; and
      - operate three Rescue Coordination Centers which respond to thousands of distress signals every year.

   b. Search and rescue represents a significant challenge for CF personnel and their equipment. The distances involved can be enormous and the operating conditions very difficult. Nevertheless, for Canadians, safeguarding human life remains an absolute priority, and the CF will continue to play a major role in this vital area."

   c. Situations that result in a search and rescue incident can and do happen anywhere in Canada at any time. To fully represent the extent of possibilities in this area it was felt that three scenarios were required, one dealing with a marine rescue incident, one dealing with a remote search and rescue incident over land, and one dealing with a major air incident in the north.

2. **Situation:**

a. A luxury cruise liner has caught fire approximately 100 NM offshore. They have declared an emergency (thus their position is known); or

b. A small aircraft is overdue at its destination in the north.

c. A major airliner has been forced down in a remote part of the north. There are survivors.

3. **Physical Environment:**

a. An offshore area in Canadian waters; or

b and c. A remote location in northern Canada.

4. **Military Environment:**

a. **Mission:**

(1) The CF are to assist the Coast Guard in maritime search and rescue.

(2) The CF are to coordinate the search and rescue effort. CF resources in addition to local resources are to be used in the rescue effort.

(3) The CF are to coordinate the rescue effort. CF resources in addition to local resources are to be used in the rescue effort.

b. **Mission Success Criteria:**

(1) Conduct successful rescue operation.

(2) Conduct successful search and rescue operation.

(3) Conduct successful rescue operation.

c. **Partial Listing of Tasks involved in the Accomplishment of the Mission:**

(1) Coordination.

(2) Search (for mission 2).

(3) Rescue (First Aid and Evacuation).

d. **Own Forces**. To be drawn from existing CF as required. Resources from other Government departments (OGDs) are to be included where appropriate. In addition, civil authority, the Civil Air Search and Rescue Association (CASARA), and volunteer resources are also to be used where appropriate.

e. **C4I Arrangements**. Coordination and cooperation with OGDs, civil authorities, CASARA, and volunteers is clearly critical in all these scenarios.

f. Sustainment Information. Operations are to be sustained as long as necessary. Duration is not expected to exceed 15 days.

5. **Civil Environment**. Normal, day to day operations.

6. **Assumption**. This scenario would operate concurrently with normal SAR activity consistent with the season and area of activity.

## SCENARIO 2 - DISASTER RELIEF IN CANADA

1. **Background:**

   a. The 94 Defence White Paper states "The CF play a key role in responding to natural and man-made disasters....Memoranda of understanding between the Department and other government agencies govern the coordination of resources in response to emergencies, and the Department will make an immediate and effective contribution to disaster relief."

   b. Disasters can be of many forms and can occur anywhere in Canada at any time. The proposed scenario is thus representative of a situation where the CF might be called upon to provide assistance, and has also been developed and used by Emergency Preparedness Canada.

2. **Situation.** An earthquake has occurred on the west coast of North America (principally British Columbia and Washington State) resulting in significant damage. There is major devastation. The major centers of Victoria, Vancouver and Seattle are severely affected with fires having broken out, buildings and highways damaged, and basic utilities disrupted. Many rural areas have been cut off and thus the total damage is not fully known at this point in time. However, the magnitude of what has occurred has clearly overwhelmed the local authorities.

3. **Physical Environment.** Major devastation has occurred north and south of the border. There is a potential for serious secondary effects.

4. **Military Environment:**

   a. Mission. To assist civil authorities in the provision of relief.

   b. Mission Success Criteria:

      (1) Respond in a timely manner,

      (2) Execute assigned and implied tasks in an effective and efficient manner, and

      (3) Sustain operations as required.

c. **Partial Listing of Tasks involved in the Accomplishment of the Mission:**

(1) Coordination and Assistance

(2) Evacuation / Transport

(3) Medical Assistance

(4) Civilian Engineer Infrastructure Damage Assessment (and aid as appropriate

(5) Provision of Food and Emergency Shelter

(6) Support to Law Enforcement Agencies / Security Tasks as appropriate

(7) Search and rescue

(8) Provision of specialty advice

(9) Provision of communications for relief operations

d. **Own Forces.** To be drawn from existing Canadian Forces as required. All other possible resources are to be included as appropriate.

e. **Coalition and Theater Situation.** Only national resources available (US forces involved with same situation south of the border). Local Law Enforcement Agencies are still in operation, but require assistance.

f. **C4I Arrangements:**

(1) Civilian communication infrastructure badly damaged.

(2) Detailed coordination / liaison required with civil authorities.

g. **Sustainment Information:**

(1) Initially deployed forces must be completely self contained.

(2) Deployed force will be sustained as long as necessary (until the local authorities and infrastructure can cope)

5. **Civil Environment.** Local infrastructure has been badly damaged by the earthquake. Civil authorities are functioning but overwhelmed by the extent of the situation.

7. **Assumption.** A civil emergency has been declared.

## SCENARIO 3 - INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

1. **Background.** The 94 Defence White Paper states that "humanitarian operations are playing a critical role in responding to the immediate consequences, both direct and indirect, of global population and resource pressures. Armed forces are being called upon increasingly to ensure a safe environment for the protection of refugees, the delivery of food and medical supplies, and the provision of essential services in countries where civil society has collapsed." The following scenario has been selected as a typical example of an international humanitarian assistance operation.

2. **Situation.** A situation has arisen in Central Africa which has placed a large number of lives at risk, and the involved country has asked for international help. Prompted by this and an active media presence in the area, governments have decided to provide humanitarian assistance to relieve human suffering and stop loss of life. The magnitude of the situation has completely overwhelmed local government, infrastructure and support facilities. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are already deployed, but are also overwhelmed. Momentum builds for a major international disaster relief operation, in which Canada has been invited to participate. Within the Canadian government, DFAIT is actively involved in coordinating the Canadian response.

3. Physical Environment. The physical environment encountered in the area of operations includes a wide range of possible terrain types (coastal, inland, urban, rural) and primarily tropical climatic conditions.

4. **Military Environment:**

   a. **Threat Information.** The level of threat encountered should be very low, but should not be discounted, as there is potential that not all involved parties / organizations will welcome foreign military involvement / aid;

   b. **Mission.** As part of an international force, elements of the CF are to i) provide humanitarian aid to relieve human suffering and help improve the situation until NGOs once more can function and assume control and ii) provide security, communications etc in support of NGO's in their role of delivering humanitarian support ;

c. **Mission Success Criteria:**

(1) Ability to field mission-mandated forces and capabilities,

(2) Ability to meet deployment timelines,

(3) Achievement of the Canadian-specific component of the mission,

(4) Ability to sustain the CF response for the required duration, and

(5) Further Mission Success Criteria would be established in conjunction with officials from Cabinet/DFAIT.

d. **Partial Listing of Tasks involved in the Accomplishment of the Mission:**

(1) Coordination with both multinational and non-governmental agencies

(2) Medical assistance

(3) Civilian engineer infrastructure damage assessment (and aid as appropriate)

(4) Delivery of food and emergency shelter

(5) Security / protection of supplies, people and equipment

(6) Security tasks (as appropriate)

(7) Provision of specialty advice

e. **Own Forces.** Existing CF forces and equipment.

f. **Coalition and Theater Situation.** As this is a major international humanitarian aid operation, support may be available from allies or other nations involved in the operation.

g. **C4I Arrangements.** C4I arrangements with National Command elements, the armed forces of other nations (not necessarily NATO allies or other interoperable armed forces), NGOs, countries providing host nation support, and civilian agencies and OGDs will be necessary. DFAIT is the lead Canadian agency.

h. **Deployment Information.** The CF elements involved in this mission will be deployed by CF-owned or arranged strategic lift assets.

i. **Sustainment Information.** Initially deployed forces must be completely self-contained. Deployed forces will be sustained as long as deemed necessary by national headquarters (until NGOs can once more operate).

5. **Civil Environment:**

   a. The amount of local infrastructure will be limited and the quality considerably different from Canadian expectations; and

   b. Linguistic and cultural differences are complicating factors.

6. **Assumptions.** None.

## SCENARIO 4 - SURVEILLANCE / CONTROL OF CANADIAN TERRITORY AND APPROACHES

1. **Background.** The 94 Defence White Paper states "Sovereignty is a vital attribute of a nation-state. For Canada, sovereignty means ensuring that, within our area of jurisdiction, Canadian law is respected and enforced. The Government is determined to see that this is so. Some have argued that the recent dramatic changes abroad have eroded the traditional rationale for the role that the Canadian Forces play in the defence of Canada. It would be a grave mistake, however, to dismantle the capacity to defend our country. Canada should never find itself in a position where, as a consequence of past decisions, the defence of our national territory has become the responsibility of others." Maintaining Canadian sovereignty can take on many forms including the provision of peacetime surveillance and control and the securing of our borders against illegal activities. The following example has been selected as representative of the requirement.

2. **Situation.** Incidents of drug smuggling and landings of illegal immigrants on both East and West coasts have resulted in calls for the Canadian Government to "do something". The Government has directed that government agencies cooperate to stem the tide of illegal activities, to the extent that platforms of interest carrying such cargoes can be identified, tracked, and, if necessary or required by law enforcement agencies, intercepted before reaching Canadian territory.

3. **Physical Environment.** Canadian territory, and the air, sea and land approaches to Canada.

4. **Military Environment:**

   a. **Threat Information.** The overall threat environment is very low. The targets of the operation are independent surface vessels or small aircraft seeking to avoid interception and effect covert transit to a Canadian destination. It is considered likely that the platforms will be equipped with technically sophisticated equipment (ESM, ECM) and armed with small arms.

   b. **Mission.** Canadian Forces are to cooperate with the appropriate OGDs (RCMP, Customs, Immigration) to conduct covert surveillance of appropriate approaches to Canada and identify platforms of interest. If necessary, the CF should be prepared to intercept them prior to their reaching Canadian territory.

c. **Mission Success Criteria:**

(1) Ability to detect and identify platforms of interest.

(2) Ability to track platforms of interest.

(3) Ability to respond to situation (intercept, board surface vessels/force landing of small aircraft) as per requests from OGDs.

(4) Ability to meet timing criteria.

d. **Partial Listing of Tasks involved in the Accomplishment of the Mission:**

(1) Contribute to threat assessment.

(2) Contribute to surveillance of Canadian approaches.

(3) Contribute to C2 process as requested.

(4) Contribute to tracking of platforms of interest.

(5) Be prepared to intercept and board/force landing of platforms of interest.

e. **Own Forces.** To be drawn from the existing CF. Resources from OGDs are to be included where appropriate.

f. **Coalition and Theater Situation.** US forces may be asked to cooperate if deemed appropriate.

g. **C4I Arrangements.** Cooperation with Canadian OGDs is clearly critical in this scenario.

h. **Sustainment Information.** Duration: A heightened state of surveillance for up to 30 days may be required (longer possible but unlikely).

5. **Civil Environment.** Normal, day to day operations.

6. Assumptions. None.

## SCENARIO 5 - EVACUATION OF CANADIANS OVERSEAS

1. **Background.** The 94 Defence White Paper states that "the Canadian Forces will maintain the capability to assist the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) in the protection and evacuation of Canadians from areas threatened by imminent conflict". The following scenario has been selected as a typical example of a service-assisted evacuation operation, and is believed to exercise the full range of capabilities required by this operation.

2. **Situation.** An internal conflict between a country's government and an insurgent group has reached a level where it threatens the stability of the country and its general peace and order. The Canadian government has decided to evacuate Canadian citizens. A similar decision has been made by several other allied nations. The proposed operation is permissive, as the government of the country has buckled under to international pressure and agreed that such an operation is a requirement.

3. **Physical Environment.** The physical environment encountered in the area of operations includes a wide range of possible terrain types (coastal, inland, urban, rural) and primarily tropical climatic conditions.

4. **Military Environment:**

   a. **Threat Information.** The insurgent group is well established and supported, and has as its ultimate aim to replace the current government of the country. The forces of this group are well supported in terms of financial support, safe havens, and military advice and training by groups in neighboring nations. It has the capacity to field both light conventional forces as well as irregular troops.

   b. **Mission.** To conduct operations to evacuate Canadian citizens from the country.

   c. **Mission Success Criteria:**

      (1) Ability to field mission-mandated forces and capabilities

      (2) Ability to meet deployment timelines

      (3) Achievement of the Canadian-specific component of the mission

(4) Sustainment of the CF response sustainable for the required duration

d. **Partial Listing of Tasks involved in the Accomplishment of the Mission:**

(1) Operations to secure launching point (as appropriate)

(2) Deployment of CF assets to area of operations

(3) Employment of Canadian Forces in evacuation and evacuation support operations

(4) Sustainment operations

(5) Coordination with both multinational and non-governmental agencies

(6) Planning with allies

(7) Evacuation / transport for Canadian citizens

(8) Provision of medical assistance for Canadian citizens

(9) Redeployment of CF elements and Canadian citizens

e. **Own Forces.** To be drawn from existing CF.

f. **Coalition and Theater Situation.** In this example, a group of like-minded nations have agreed to cooperate in this evacuation operation.

g. **C4I Arrangements.** C4I arrangements with National Command elements, the armed forces of other nations (not necessarily NATO allies or other interoperable armed forces), and civilian agencies and OGDs will be necessary. DFAIT is the lead Canadian agency.

h. **Deployment Information.** The CF elements involved in this mission will be deployed by CF-owned or arranged strategic lift.

i. **Sustainment Information.** Deployed forces must be completely self-contained for the duration of the mission.

5. **Civil Environment:**

   a. Quality and quantity of local infrastructure will be considerably different from Canadian expectations.

   b. Linguistic and cultural differences may be complicating factors.

6. **Assumption.** This will be a permissive evacuation operation.

## SCENARIO 6 - PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS (CHAPTER 6)

1. **Background.** The 94 Defence White Paper states that "Canada is strongly in favour of a vigorous and effective United Nations, capable of upholding the political values and procedural means set out in its Charter, and believes that situations requiring international military action should be dealt with in accordance with the terms of the Charter." The following scenario has been selected as a typical example of this UN operation, and is believed to exercise the full range of capabilities required in Peace Support operations mandated under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter.

2. **Situation.** Tension between two bordering states escalated until actual conflict broke out. After a series of quick successes and setbacks on both sides, the situation evolved into a prolonged stalemate. Both parties agreed to a UN-brokered cease-fire, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have deployed into the area, and it has been decided to establish a UN force under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter to conduct peacekeeping operations along the border area.

3. **Physical Environment.** The two countries involved are part of a large island. The physical environment encountered would include terrain from both coastal regions and inland, urban and rural.

4. **Military Environment:**

   a. **Threat Information.** The overall threat environment is low. UN Forces are being formed at the request of the two states previously involved in the conflict. The cease-fire is holding at the current time.

   b. **Mission.** To conduct peacekeeping operations under the auspices of Chapter 6 of the UN Charter.

   c. **Mission Success Criteria:**

      (1) Ability to field mission-mandated forces and capabilities

      (2) Ability to meet mission-deployment timelines

      (3) Achievement of the Canadian-specific component of the mission

      (4) Sustainment of the CF response for the required duration

d. **Partial Listing of Tasks involved in the Accomplishment of the Mission:**

(1) Deployment of CF assets to area of operations

(2) Employment of Canadian Forces in peacekeeping duties

(3) Sustainment operations

(4) Redeployment of CF elements

e. **Own Forces.** To be drawn from existing CF.

f. **Coalition and Theater Situation.** In this example, other nations have also agreed to participate in the UN operation.

g. **C4I Arrangements.** C4I arrangements with National Command elements, the armed forces of other nations (not necessarily NATO allies or other interoperable armed forces), NGOs, the two states involved in the initial conflict, and UN Headquarters will be necessary.

h. **Deployment Information.** The CF elements involved in this mission will be deployed by CF-owned or arranged strategic lift assets.

i. **Sustainment Information.** Sustainment of CF elements will be accomplished according to negotiated support arrangements (force initially self-sufficient for a set period of time after which negotiated CA and UN support arrangements are put in place). The duration of the operation is indefinite and will be based on the standard six month timeframe (with extension of the mandate possible at the end of each six month period).

5. **Civil Environment.** Canadian and International support for the mission will be obvious (witness the approved Peacekeeping Force mission and mandate). NGOs will be active in the area. Some host nation support will be available, but some facilities normally available will have been damaged by hostilities.

6. **Assumption.** The scenario as envisaged will involve Stage 2 Mobilization (Force Enhancement).

## SCENARIO 7 - AID OF THE CIVIL POWER

1. **Background.** Throughout Canadian history, provinces have been able to call upon the armed forces to maintain or restore law and order where it is beyond the power of civil authorities to do so. The Chief of the Defence Staff determines the nature of the response to the provincial Attorney-General's request. The CF do not replace the civil power; they assist it in the maintenance of law and order.

2. **Situation.** Canada has been suffering through several years of drought and across the country water rationing has been enforced. Minor disputes, over access to water, have become more and more commonplace pitting individual against individual and individual against industry. As water has grown more and more scarce the groups involved in disputes have had time to become organized. In at least one case a minor dispute has escalated creating large scale unrest, up to and including armed insurrection spilling over inter-provincial borders. The situation has reached a point where civilian authorities can no longer cope, and military assistance has been requested.

3. **Physical Environment.** Canada, to include urban and rural environment.

4. **Military Environment:**

   a. **Threat Information.** By the time the CF have been called in groups have had the time to become organized. There is a clear possibility of armed action in some instances.

   b. **Mission.** To assist the civil authorities in restoring law and order.

   c. **Mission Success Criteria:**

      (1) The restoration of law and order to a level that the provincial authorities can cope.

      (2) The above must be achieved with the minimum use of force and with minimal casualties.

   d. **Partial Listing of Tasks involved in the Accomplishment of the Mission:**

      (1) Assist in threat assessment

      (2) Assist in surveillance

(3) Assist in controlling access/perimeter control

(4) Assist in the subduing of rebels

(5) Assist in the eviction of rebels from occupied areas

e. **Own Forces.** To be drawn from existing CF as required. Provincial resources are to be included where appropriate.

f. **C4I Arrangements.** Coordination with federal and provincial authorities and law enforcement agencies is clearly critical in this scenario.

g. **Sustainment Information.** Deployed troops are to be self-contained. A duration of one to three months is likely.

5. **Civil Environment.** The drought has caused severe water shortages. Lack of an adequate water supply is having an impact on daily life, industry, agriculture etc.

6. **Assumption.** The scenario as envisaged will involve Stage 2 Mobilization (Force Enhancement).

## SCENARIO 8 - NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY / INTERESTS ENFORCEMENT

1. **Background.** Canadians have made clear their wish to protect Canada's natural resources from illegal and highly damaging exploitation. A current example of this is fisheries protection where, with the dwindling of major fish stocks, the issue has become more urgent. The situation described in this scenario is hypothetical, although it may be considered to be typical of the types of situations that might be encountered in the future.

2. **Situation.** Discovery of highly concentrated deposits of gold, copper and zinc in commercially exploitable quantities on the seabed close to the 200 NM limit of Canada's coast have led to a dispute over seabed rights. Canadian claims for extended jurisdiction under UNCLOS III have been rejected by a certain country, and deep seabed exploitation vessels from that country have begun just beyond the 200 NM limit resulting in increased friction. Coast Guard vessels sent to warn these vessels off were turned back by small arms fire. Subsequently the country dispatched a frigate to protect her claims to these seabed resources, and rejected Canadian calls for a cessation of seabed operations until the case had been resolved by international arbitration, labeling such action as simple obstructionism.

3. **Physical Environment.** An offshore area which Canada is claiming jurisdiction over.

4. Military Environment:

   a. **Threat Information.** Previous to the dispute the threat environment was very low. As the dispute continues escalation up to moderate intensity can be considered.

   b. **Mission.** The CF are to enforce Canadian claims in the extended Economic Exclusive Zone by supporting Coast Guard operations aimed at halting the other country's deep seabed operations. If hostile operations are encountered, the CF will be required to conduct sea control operations in order to achieve the Canadian national objective of asserting sovereignty over the seabed resources in dispute.

   c. **Mission Success Criteria:**

      (1) Ability to provide combat capable forces in a timely manner.

      (2) Ability to stop the other country from mining (i.e. enforce Canadian

claims).

d. **Partial Listing of Tasks involved in the Accomplishment of the Mission:**

(1) Contribute to threat assessment.

(2) Contribute to surveillance of the area of dispute.

(3) Contribute to the C2 picture/process.

(4) Use of combat capable forces as required.

e. **Own Forces.** To be drawn from existing CF as required.

f. **C4I Arrangements.** Cooperation with Canadian OGD's is clearly critical in this scenario.

g. **Sustainment Information.** Duration: 30 to 90 days (longer possible but unlikely).

5. **Civil Environment.** Normal, day to day operations at the start of the scenario.

6. **Assumption.** The scenario as envisaged will involve Stage 2 Mobilization (Force Enhancement).

## SCENARIO 9 - PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS (CHAPTER 7)

1. **Background.** The 94 Defence White Paper states that "Canada is strongly in favour of a vigorous and effective United Nations, capable of upholding the political values and procedural means set out in its Charter, and believes that situations requiring international military action should be dealt with in accordance with the terms of the Charter." The following scenario has been selected as a typical example of this UN operation, and is believed to exercise the full range of capabilities required in Peace Support operations mandated under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.

2. **Situation.** Tension between two bordering states has escalated until intense armed conflict broke out. One state is about to attain an overwhelming victory over its opponent. It has been assessed by the international community that this would be unacceptable. This led to a decision in the UN to restore the previous situation, and resulted in an international force being formed. A coalition force is being established under the auspices of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.

3. **Physical Environment.** The physical environment encountered would include terrain from both coastal regions and inland, urban and rural, with the dominant inland terrain being desert.

4. **Military Environment.**

   a. **Threat Information.** Enemy forces to be faced will include a full range of combat capability, with modern tactical doctrine and current generation equipment for its land, naval and air forces. Enemy C4I assets are assessed to be state-of-the-art. Use of NBC weapons against coalition forces is assessed as being unlikely, but can not be completely discounted.

   b. **Mission.** As part of a coalition of like-minded nations formed under the auspices of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, elements of the CF are to conduct operations to restore the pre-conflict boundaries as well as enforce a naval embargo and a no flight zone.

   c. **Mission Success Criteria:**

      (1) Ability to field mission-mandated forces and capabilities

      (2) Ability to meet mission-deployment timelines

(3) Achievement of the Canadian-specific component of the mission

(4) Sustainment of the CF response for required duration

d. **Partial Listing of Tasks involved in the Accomplishment of the Mission:**

(1) Operations to secure Coalition Force launching point (as appropriate)

(2) Deployment of CF assets to area of operations

(3) Employment of Canadian Forces in operations

(4) Sustainment operations

(5) Redeployment of CF elements

e. **Own Forces.** To be drawn from existing CF.

f. **Coalition and Theater Situation.** In this example, a group of like-minded nations have agreed to participate in this operation under the auspices of a UN resolution mandated under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.

g. **C4I Arrangements.** C4I arrangements with the coalition headquarters, National Command elements, the armed forces of other nations (not necessarily NATO allies or other interoperable armed forces), and UN Headquarters will be necessary.

h. **Deployment Information.** The CF elements involved in this mission will be deployed by CF-owned or arranged strategic lift assets.

i. **Sustainment Information.** Sustainment of CF elements will be accomplished according to negotiated support arrangements (force initially self-sufficient for a set period of time after which negotiated CA and UN support arrangements are put in place). The duration of the operation is anticipated to be 3 months to one year.

5. **Civil Environment.** Canadian and International support for the mission will be obvious (witness the formation of the coalition and the UN Resolution which leads to its mandate). No host nation support will be available.

6. **Assumption.** The scenario as envisaged will involve Stage 3 Mobilization (Force Expansion).

## SCENARIO 10 - DEFENCE OF CANADA /U.S. TERRITORY

1. **Background.** Over the years, the combined planning for the defence of North America has evolved into the Canada-US Basic Security Plan. The Basic Security Plan provides for the coordinated use of both countries' sea, land and air forces in the event of hostilities. As part of the Basic Security Plan, Canada is committed to assigning specified forces to the defence of the continent.

2. Situation. Canada, along with the United States, is participating in a coalition operation to restore the territorial integrity of an invaded nation. (Refer to Scenario 11 - Collective Defence). Intelligence assessments have determined that the aggressor nation may undertake threatening action against Canada and/or the US to foster national support and to demonstrate its military might and the vulnerability of the North American coalition partners.

3. **Physical Environment.** The air and sea approaches to North America.

4. **Military Environment:**

   a. **Threat Information.** The aggressor controls an effective military force that is capable of carrying out an attack on North America. The aggressor possesses nuclear and chemical weapons and delivery platforms. An attack could range from instigating or funding internal discontent to repeated incursions into sovereign territory by aircraft, surface and/or sub-surface vessels.

   b. **Mission.** Timely threat warning and accurate attack assessment must be provided. In cooperation with US military forces, Canadian Forces would conduct surveillance of air and maritime approaches to North America. The CF would attempt to detect, identify, and intercept the hostile vessel/aircraft before it arrives within attack range of North America. Land Forces would provide land surveillance and vital point protection.

   c. **Mission Success Criteria.** Timely threat warning and accurate attack assessment to permit the effective use of forces. Detection, identification and interception of the hostile vessel/force before it is able to conduct the attack.

   d. **Partial Listing of Tasks involved in the Accomplishment of the Mission:**

      (1) Surveillance, identification and intercept.

(2) Land surveillance and protection of Vital Points.

(3) Naval Mine/EOD clearance operations.

e. **Own Forces.** At a minimum, Canada will assign forces in accordance with the Basic Security Plan.

f. **Coalition and Theater Situation.** US forces are conducting wide area surveillance operations and have forces prepared to intercept upon identification of the target.

g. **C4I Arrangements.** Coordination with US forces required.

h. **Sustainment Information.** Surveillance operations may continue for up to 30 days. Longer durations may be required.

5. **Civil Environment.** Within the context of this scenario, normal day-to-day operations could be expected. However, with this situation occurring concurrently with Scenario 11 (Collective Defence), some degree of mobilization would be anticipated.

6. **Assumptions.** This scenario operates concurrently with Scenario # 11 - Collective Defence. In the execution of scenarios 10 and 11 it is intended that mobilization stages 3 and 4 be activated where required.

**SCENARIO 11 - COLLECTIVE DEFENCE**

1. **Background:**

   a. The 1994 Defence White Paper re-affirmed Canada's commitment to have the Canadian Forces contribute to international security. Canada will continue to play an active military role in the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As a demonstration of resolve, Canada has made the commitment to deploy sizable land, maritime and air forces to support NATO military operations.

   b. This scenario is fictional and is intended to be illustrative of the nature of collective defence operations in which Canada may be involved.

2. **Situation:**

   a. A NATO nation and its neighbour have a long-standing dispute over a border. Although there is an extensive history surrounding the border dispute, the current borders, with the disputed territory within the boundary of the NATO nation, have been recognized by the international community. A recent natural resources discovery within the area has rekindled the dispute.

   b. With a faltering economy, growing national debt, and diminishing standard of living, the neighbouring nation has resurrected territorial claims for lands adjacent to the disputed border. This led to increased tension, until the neighbouring nation invaded the disputed area. The invading armed forces established control over significant territory before being halted, and both armed forces have now adopted hasty defensive postures.

3. **Physical Environment.** The land mass involved includes a wide variety of terrain types, including plains, highlands, mountains, coastal areas and urban centres. Both countries possess a coastline with deep water approaches and several port facilities.

4. **Military Environment:**

   a. **Threat Information.** The enemy forces include a full range of combat capability, with modern tactical doctrine and current generation equipment for its land, naval and air forces. Enemy C4I assets are assessed to be state-of-

the-art. Use of NBC weapons against NATO forces is assessed as being unlikely, but cannot be completely discounted.

b. **Mission.** The CF, as part of the NATO forces, will conduct operations to restore and return control of the invaded territory, waters and airspace to the NATO nation.

c. **Mission Success Criteria:**

(1) Ability to field mission-mandated forces and capabilities

(2) Ability to meet mission-deployment timelines

(3) Achievement of the Canadian-specific component of the mission

(4) Sustainability of the CF response for the required duration

d. **Partial Listing of Tasks involved in the Accomplishment of the Mission:**

(1) Deploy forces to theatre.

(2) Secure the rear area for the assembly and deployment of NATO forces.

(3) Defend territory not yet occupied by the invading nation.

(4) Eject enemy forces from invaded territory.

(5) Establish a buffer zone along the internationally recognized border.

(6) Assist in the restoration of civil authority in the occupied territory.

(7) Sustain forces as long as required.

e. **Own Forces.** In support of the NATO operation, Canada will deploy forces in accordance with the 94 White Paper and NATO DPQ commitments. This force will initially include one Naval Task Group of four combatants plus a support ship and appropriate maritime air support, a Brigade Group, a wing of fighter aircraft with air-to-air refueling assets a squadron of tactical transport aircraft and an infantry battalion group. Prolongation of the conflict would result in full mobilization of Canada (Stage 4 of Mobilization plans).

f. **Coalition and Theatre Situation.** NATO commences its operation with the deployment of the RRF(A) and IRF(L). Subsequent deployment of the NATO Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) is undertaken. The invaded nation's forces include a full range of combat capability, with modern tactical doctrine and current generation equipment for its land, naval and air forces.

g. **C4I Arrangements.** NATO C4 arrangements apply.

h. **Deployment Information.** NATO has retained control of the ports and airfields in the rear areas of the nation to support the deployment of NATO military forces. NATO deployment would commence with the IRF(L) and RRF(A) forces, and thirty days following the deployment of the IRF, preparations would begin for the deployment of the ARRC.

i. **Sustainment Information.** CF elements would have to be sustained for as long as required.

5. **Civil Environment.** The majority of the civilian population is still in place..

6. **Assumptions:**

a. This scenario runs concurrently with Scenario 10 (Defence of Canada/ U.S. Territory).

b. NATO retains control of ports and airfields to support deployment of NATO military forces.

c. The rapid deployment of NATO forces deters other nations from entering the conflict in support of the invading nation.

d. Military operations will be confined to the territories, airspace and waters of the two involved nations.

e. This scenario would entail mobilization to Stage 4 (Full Mobilization).

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The Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS) was tasked to coordinate the development of a minimum scenario set for departmental force planning. To meet this requirement the Director of Defence Analysis (DDA) sponsored a departmental workshop to develop the scenario set and to produce a brief write-up (a "snapshot") of each scenario selected. The foundation document for the exercise was the 1994 Defence White Paper, whilst the Defence Planning Guidance 1997 was used as an amplifying document. The scenarios selected were to be a minimum set, be credible and realistic, build upon work previously carried out and apply to the Canadian Forces as a whole, not be single service specific.

This report documents the proceedings of the workshop and the results that were produced.

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